To counter a general belief that all the paradoxes stem from a kind of circularity (or involve some self-reference, or use a diagonal argument) Stephen Yablo designed a paradox in 1993 that seemingly avoided self-reference. We turn Yablo's paradox, the most challenging paradox in the recent years, into a genuine mathematical theorem in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Indeed, Yablo's paradox comes in several varieties; and he showed in 2004 that there are other versions that are equally paradoxical. Formalizing these versions of Yablo's paradox, we prove some theorems in LTL. This is the first time that Yablo's paradox(es) become new(ly discovered) theorems in mathematics and logic.
Introduction
Paradoxes are interesting puzzles in philosophy and mathematics. They can be more interesting when they turn into genuine theorems. For example, Russell's paradox which collapsed Frege's foundations of mathematics, is now a classical theorem in set theory, implying that no set of all sets can exist. Or, as another example, the Liar paradox has turned into Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth in sufficiently rich languages. This paradox also appears implicitly in the proof of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. For this particular theorem, some other paradoxes such as Berry's ( [2, 3] ) or Yablo's ( [12, 13] ) have been used to give alternative proofs ( [5, 9] ). A more recent example is the surprise examination paradox [4] that has turned into a beautiful proof for Gödel's second incompleteness theorem ( [8] ).
In this paper we transform Yablo's paradox into a theorem in the Linear Temporal Logic. This paradox, which is the first one of its kind that supposedly avoids self-reference and circularity has been used for proving an old theorem ( [5, 9] ) but not a new theorem had been made out of it. In this paper, for the very first time, we use this paradox (actually its argument) for proving some genuine mathematical theorem in Linear Temporal Logic. Roughly speaking, we show that certain operators do not have fixed-points in this logic, where the proof is exactly Yablo's paradox (reaching to a contradiction by assuming the existence of certain fixed-point sentences). Let us note that very many other operations in the Linear Temporal Logic do have fixed-points, which constitute some other genuine mathematical theorems.
Yablo's Paradox
To counter a general belief that all the paradoxes stem from a kind of circularity (or involve some selfreference, or use a diagonal argument) Stephen Yablo designed a paradox in 1993 that seemingly avoided self-reference ( [13, 12] ). Let us fix our reading of Yablo's Paradox: Consider the sequence of sentences {Y n } n∈N such that for each n ∈ N:
Y n ⇐⇒ ∀k > n (Y k is not true). The paradox follows from the following deductions. For each n ∈ N,
is not true) and ∀k > n + 1 (Y k is not true) =⇒ (Y n+1 is not true) and (Y n+1 is true), thus Y n is not true. So, ∀k (Y k is not true), and in particular ∀k > 0 (Y k is not true), and so Y 0 must be true (and not true at the same time); contradiction! Some paradoxes turn into mathematical-logical tautologies and so become (interesting) theorems. For example, Liar's paradox when translated into first-order logic is a sentence L such that L ↔ ¬L. The fact that this is contradictory is equivalent to the fact that the formula ¬ ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ is a tautology in propositional logic. As another less trivial paradox, take Russell's paradox: there can be no set S such that for every x we have x ∈ S ↔ x ∈ x. Writing this in first-order logic (in the language {∈}) we have a logical theorem: ¬∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ x). Indeed, this first-order logical tautology still holds when we replace the membership relation ∈ with an arbitrary binary relation R: the sentence ¬∃y∀x(xRy ↔ ¬xRx) is again a first-order logical tautology. On the other hand if xRy is interpreted as "y shaves x" then the above tautology is nothing but Barber's Paradox. As for Yablo's paradox, J. Ketland has translated it into first-order logic (called Uniform Homogeneous Yablo Scheme) in [7] : (Y) : ∀x ϕ(x) ↔ ∀y[xRy → ¬ϕ(y)] , where R is a binary formula (which could be a binary relation symbol, i.e. an atomic formula) with the auxiliary axioms stating that R is total and transitive:
( 
Linear Temporal Logic
Here, we show that there is another way to have a formal version of Yablo's paradox (different from the formalized version discussed above), and that is in Linear Temporal Logic. The (propositional) linear temporal logic (LTL) is a logical formalism that can refer to time; in LTL one can encode formulae about the future, e.g., a condition will eventually be true, a condition will be true until another fact becomes true, etc. LTL was first proposed for the formal verification of computer programs in 1977 by Amir Pnueli [10] . For a modern introduction to LTL and its syntax and semantics see e.g. [6] . Two modality operators in LTL that we will use are the "next" modality denoted by and the "always" modality denoted as .
Syntax and Semantics of LTL
We assume the reader is familiar with the general framework of LTL, but for the sake of accessibility, we list the main notations, definitions and theorems which will be referred to later on. For details we refer the reader to [6] . Let V be a set of propositional constants. The alphabet of a basic language L LTL (V) (also shortly: L LTL ) of propositional linear temporal logic LTL is given by all propositional constants of V and the symbols {false, →, , , (, )}. The inductive definition of formulas (of L LTL (V)) is as follows:
1-Every propositional constant of V and also the constant symbol false is a formula. 2-If ϕ and ψ are formulas then (ϕ → ψ) is a formula. 3-If ϕ is a formula then ϕ and ϕ are formulas. Further operators can be introduced as abbreviations:
¬, ∨, ∧, ↔, true as in classical logic, and ♦ϕ ≡ ¬ ¬ϕ. The temporal operators , , and ♦ are called next time, always (or henceforth), and sometime (or eventuality) operators, respectively. Formulas ϕ, ϕ, and ♦ϕ are typically read "next ϕ", "always ϕ", and "sometime ϕ".
Semantical interpretations in classical propositional logic are given by Boolean valuations. For LTL we have to extend this concept according to our informal idea that formulas are evaluated over sequences of states (time scales). Let V be a set of propositional constants. A temporal (or Kripke) structure for V is an infinite sequence K = (η 0 , η 1 , η 2 , ...) of mappings η i : V → {ff, tt} called states, and η 0 is called the initial state of K. Observe that states are just valuations in the classical logic sense. For K and i ∈ K, we define K i (F ) ∈ {ff, tt} (informally meaning the "truth value of F in the i th state of K") for every formula F inductively as follows:
01.
05. K i ( ϕ) = tt ⇐⇒ K j (ϕ) = tt for every j ≥ i. Obviously, the formula false and the operator → behave classically in each state. The definitions for and make these operators formalize the phrases in the next state and from this step onward. More precisely, the formula ϕ informally means "ϕ holds in all forthcoming states including the present one". The definitions induce the following truth values for the formula abbreviations:
06.
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The formula ϕ is called a consequence of a set F of formulas (F |= ϕ) if |= K ϕ holds for every K such that |= K ψ for all ψ ∈ F. The formula ϕ is called (universally) valid (|= ϕ) if ∅ |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is called (locally) satisfiable if there is a temporal structure K and i ∈ N such that K(ϕ) = tt.
The formula ϕ holds (in the current moment) when ϕ is true in the "next step", and the formula ϕ is true (in the current moment) when ϕ is true "now and forever" ("always in the future"). In the other words, is the reflexive and transitive closure of . So the formula ψ is true when ψ is true from the next step onward, that is ψ holds in the next step, and the step after that, and the step after that, etc. The same holds for ψ; indeed the formula ψ ←→ ψ is a law of LT L (T12 on page 28 of [6] ). It can also be seen that the formula ¬ϕ ←→ ¬ ϕ is always true (is a law of LTL, see T1 on page 27 of [6] ), since ϕ is untrue in the next step if and only if it is not the case that "ϕ is true in the next step". Whence, we have the equivalences ¬ϕ ←→ ¬ϕ ←→ ¬ ϕ in LTL. The following theorem will be used in our arguments. Proof. To show this formula is valid will exactly follow the line of Yablo's reasoning to obtain his paradox, this time in LTL. By Theorem 3.2, to prove the formula ¬ (ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ) is valid in LTL, we need to show the formula (ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ) is not satisfiable. For a moment assume that there is a Kripke structure K and n ∈ N for which
(2) For all j ≥ n we have K j (ϕ) = ff. So ff = K n (ϕ) = K n+1 ( ¬ϕ) hence there must exist some i > n with K i (ϕ) = tt which contradicts (1) above. Thus, the formula (ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ) cannot be satisfiable in LTL. J Also, a Gödel-like argument can show that the operators x → ¬ x and x → ¬x cannot have any fixed-points in LTL as well.
Proposition 3.4
The operators x → ¬ x and x → ¬x do not have any fixed-points in LTL; i.e. for any formula ϕ we have LTL |= ¬ (ϕ ↔ ¬ ϕ) and LTL |= ¬ (ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ).
Proof. We show that satisfiability of (ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ) in LTL leads to a contradiction. For a moment let there exist some Kripke structure K and n ∈ N for which K n ( (ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ)) = tt. Then for any i ≥ n we have
(since |= ¬ϕ → ¬ϕ). Then, in particular, ff = K n (ϕ) = K n ( ¬ϕ) and so there must exist some m ≥ n such that K m (¬ϕ) = ff contradiction! J Some other operators like x → x or x → ¬ x do have fixed-points; true or false for the former and the sequences ff, tt, ff, tt, ff, tt, · · · or tt, ff, tt, ff, tt, ff, · · · for the latter (see [1] ).
Other Versions of Yablo's Paradox
Yablo's paradox comes in several varieties [14] ; here we show that other versions of Yablo's paradox become interesting theorems in LTL as well.
(always):
It can be seen that all the sequences {Y n } n∈N of sentences above are paradoxical. These sequences of sentences can be formalized in LTL as follows:
The following (sometimes) counterpart of Theorem 3.3 directly follows.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3 we have LTL |= ¬ (ψ ↔ ¬ψ) for any arbitrary formula ψ. In particular for ψ = ¬ϕ we have LTL |= ¬ (¬ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ ↔ ¬ ♦¬ϕ), whence for any ϕ we conclude that LTL |= ¬ (ϕ ↔ ♦¬ϕ). J Let us focus now on the "almost always" version of Yablo's paradox. Let Y 0 , Y 1 , Y 2 , ... be a sequence of sentences that each sentence, roughly speaking, says "all sentences, except finitely many, after this sentence are false". Mathematically, this sequence is as below:
The paradox arises when we try to assign truth values in a consistent way to all Y i 's. Assume for a moment that there is a sentence (say) Y n which is true; so there exists i > n for which all Y j with j ≥ i are untrue. In particular, Y i is untrue. Since all the sentences Y i+1 , Y i+2 , ... are untrue, so Y i has to be true. Therefore, Y i is true and false the same time, which is a contradiction. Whence, all Y n 's are untrue, so Y 0 is true, a contradiction again. Now we turn this version of Yablo's paradox to a theorem in LTL.
o p y r i g h t e d M a n u s c r i p t Proof. We show that the formula (ϕ ↔ ♦ ¬ϕ) is not satisfiable in LTL. For a moment, assume that there is a Kripke structure K and a state n ∈ N for which K n (ϕ ↔ ♦ ¬ϕ) = tt. So, we have ∀i ≥ n K i (ϕ ↔ ♦ ¬ϕ) = tt which implies ∀i ≥ n K i (ϕ) = K i ( ♦ ¬ϕ) which is equivalent to ∀i ≥ n ∃j ≥ 0 K i (ϕ) = K i+j+1 ( ¬ϕ).
(1) If there is some l ≥ n such that K l (ϕ) = tt, then K l+m+1 ( ¬ϕ) = tt for some m; so K l+m+1 (ϕ) = ff and also K k (ϕ) = ff for all k ≥ l + m + 1. On the other hand there must exist some p ≥ 0 such that K l+m+1+p+1 ( ¬ϕ) = ff which implies that K l+m+1+p+1+q (ϕ) = tt for some q ≥ 0. This is a contradiction since l + m + 1 + p + 1 + q ≥ l + m + 1.
(2) If K l (ϕ) = ff holds for all l ≥ n, then in particular K n (ϕ) = ff and so there exists some m ≥ 0 such that K n+m+1 ( ¬ϕ) = ff; whence K n+m+1+p (ϕ) = tt for some p ≥ 0, which contradicts (1) Proof. LTL |= ¬ (ψ ↔ ♦ ¬ψ) holds for any formula ψ by Theorem 4.2. For ψ = ¬ϕ we obtain the deduction LTL |= ¬ (¬ϕ ↔ ♦ ¬¬ϕ ↔ ¬ ♦¬ϕ ↔ ¬ ♦¬ϕ) which completes the proof. J
